This is one measure of the growing effectiveness of the Ukrainian military over the past year. That Ukraine has also…
Summary
Ukraine has achieved unprecedented military effectiveness with a 1.4:1 killed-to-wounded ratio and 1:7 to 1:11 casualty advantage over Russia, demonstrating revolutionary tactics combining drones, training, and advanced C2 systems. Western militaries must learn and rapidly adopt these methods while integrated into broader national strategies, as adversaries like Russia and China will likely attempt to replicate Ukraine's lethal innovations in future conflicts.
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- #1
This is one measure of the growing effectiveness of the Ukrainian military over the past year. That Ukraine has also almost halted Russian ground advances, and imposed a 1.4:1 killed:wounded ratio on the Russians shows that Ukraine may have developed the most effective, lethal military force in modern history. This is why Putin needs Trump, Kushner and Witkoff to help him. What does this mean? 1/12 🇺🇦 🧵
- #2
2/ The kill:wounded ratio is perhaps a greater indicator of Ukrainian effectiveness than the number killed per day. The 1.4:1 ratio comes from an announcement by President Zelenskyy about how 62% of Russian casualties are now killed. kyivindependent.com/62-killed-38-w…
- #3
3/ For those who study military history, this is unprecedented. Historical killed:wounded rations in modern wars are shown below (US Army). Some theatres saw slightly different ratios. Perhaps the worst was the eastern front in WW2 where the German Army suffered a nearly 1:1 ratio.
- #4
4/ Another important measure of effectiveness for Ukrainian forces in 2026 is the widening casualty rate between Ukraine and Russia. While Ukrainian statistics are a little harder to come by than Russian estimates, this week, Stefan Korshak published the following:
- #5
5/ If we accept that these figures are broadly in the ballpark, we can see that Ukraine is reducing its casualties while significantly increasing Russias. Therefore, using General Staff and western think tank estimates of around 410K Russian casualties for 2025, and almost 409K for 2026 so far, we can see a Ukraine: Russia casualty ratio of 1:7 in 2025 and 1:11 in 2026. While rough, this is where Ukraine needs to be in a war against a nation that out-numbers it in population by about 4 to 1.
- #6
6/ What might we deduce from this? First, Ukraine has developed highly evolved ways of killing the enemy and imposing disproportionate casualties in the tactical and operational spaces. These methods are founded on old methods (such as organisational constructs, infantry, artillery, etc), and overlaid with drone saturation, training, connected C2, better data aggregation, analysis and exploitation, as well as newer units for drones at many levels.
- #7
7/ Second, the Russians have been fast following Ukrainian methods and organisational constructs but have not (yet) been able to fully replicate what Ukraine has done. This is a learning and adaptation gap (source of advantage) that Ukraine must continue to exploit. It requires a mix of ever faster learning and change combined with ensuring that these changes to in fact result in increased military effectiveness. Effective adaptation = faster + better. But understating learning gaps between our own forces and adversaries also matters.
- #8
8/ Third, others are watching. We should expect our adversaries to replicate this to the maximum degree possible against Western military forces. For example, while Russia might be behind Ukraine in the learning curve here, it would be vastly ahead of European military institutions from day one of any conflict (at least in this part of warfare). We should expect that China, with its massive drone production base, will seek to achieve similar results in any future Pacific conflict to shock Western nations into rapid capitulation or ceasefires.
- #9
9/ Fourth, while it has taken about 4 years of testing, learning and sacrifice for Ukraine’s military to reach this point, those learning from and emulating Ukraine’s approach might be able to do this in the initial days and weeks of a future conflict. The ramp up to this level of killing will be far more rapid than it has been since 2022. Western military institutions need to ensure they are the ones who ramp up faster than potential adversaries in Europe and the Pacific. But that will take more institutional humility henceforth than what we have seen since 2022.
- #10
10/ Finally, the current casualty rates against Russia must be an important part of Ukrainian narratives about their success against Russia. It is also a vital element of countering Russian narratives about inevitable victory. Such narratives may be used by adversaries in future conflicts to influence friendly politicians and populations.
- #11
11/ The ability to kill large numbers of the enemy, and do so in a way that is disproportionate to one’s own casualties, is an important measure of military effectiveness at the tactical and operational levels. It always has been. Ukraine has shown the way to do this in the 21st century, and it is now perhaps one of the most lethal military institutions in history.
- #12
12/ But winning wars demands an array of different tactical, operational, strategic and national competencies. And conditions vary between different theatres. Lethality matters - but so too does sustaining national purpose and will, defending strategic infrastructure, winning the battle of narratives and sustaining support from allies. Western governments and military institutions must be able to emulate Ukraine’s battlespace lethality for their own conditions - and ensure this is cleverly integrated into wider national war strategies. End