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Sergey Vakulenko@SergeyVakulenk0 · Nov 13, 2026

The petrol situation in Russia is becoming very serious. Counting the strikes on Omsk and Volgograd on 11 and 12…

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Summary

Recent Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries have damaged facilities accounting for approximately 55% of Russia's petroleum and diesel production. If the expected additional strikes on other major refineries occur, the government may need to severely restrict private fuel consumption to manage potential shortages of 35-60%, marking a significant escalation from previous disruptions.

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  1. #1

    The petrol situation in Russia is becoming very serious. Counting the strikes on Omsk and Volgograd on 11 and 12 November respectively, the facilities that have come under attack account for ~55% of total Russian petrol and diesel output and of domestic market supplies. 🧵 1/16

  2. #2

    We don't know to what extent output at each refinery has been affected, whether refining has been completely halted, exactly which units were hit, etc. 2/16

  3. #3

    But given how massive the recent raids have been, the assumption that production has been halted completely may well be valid. November demand is about 5% lower than July's, so that will help, but not much. 3/16

  4. #4

    October was quiet, so some stocks were probably built up, perhaps a week's worth of national consumption. Now everything depends on how badly the refineries have been damaged and how quickly they come back on stream. 4/16

  5. #5

    And I think hits on Nizhnekamsk, Perm and Tyumen are highly likely in the coming days. If that happens, the impacted plants will account for almost exactly 2/3 of petrol supplies to the domestic market. Add Moscow, and the figure rises to nearly 3/4. 5/16

  6. #6

    Moscow is probably last in line among candidate targets – it is a costly target because of the density of the air defences around it. The refinery can still be hit; it would just take noticeably more drones, which could have a greater impact elsewhere. 6/16

  7. #7

    There was a moment in Russia's recent history when petrol consumption fell to about 30% of normal – April 2020, the very peak of COVID. Diesel consumption went down by ~10%, however – commercial traffic was still there. 7/16

  8. #8

    Picture the traffic levels back then: it was travel restrictions that brought consumption down to that level, even though there was plenty of petrol. 8/16

  9. #9

    If petrol output does fall by the volumes described, the government will have to introduce measures to bring demand into balance with the available supplies. That can no longer be done through market mechanisms. 9/16

  10. #10

    The government will be forced to restrict private petrol consumption drastically, almost to zero. As the COVID experience showed, this is not fatal, and the country can function at that level of consumption. But that is a very long way from any kind of normality. 10/16

  11. #11

    The diesel picture is somewhat rosier thanks to substantial export-oriented capacity, which could be diverted to the domestic market, but the country could already face a ~35% shortage against normal demand given the damage already done, rising to ~60% in the worst case. 11/16

  12. #12

    In my 2024 articles on the petrol crisis I wrote that, at that stage, the attacks on refineries were a nuisance that imposed costs, but that if they intensified they could create problems. 12/16

  13. #13

    In 2025 I wrote that, at the scale of attacks then, there should be no serious disruptions to petrol supplies, but that an increase in the power, frequency and reach of the strikes on refineries would lead to trouble and inconvenience on an entirely different scale. 13/16

  14. #14

    In June 2026 I noted that the country was coming right up against the threshold at which trouble and inconvenience turn into major problems. It appears that in November 2026 this threshold is being crossed. 14/16

  15. #15

    Even if this wave of attacks was a one-off operation for which Ukraine had to spend a long time accumulating forces and resources, the consequences could be quite significant. 15/16

  16. #16

    If, however, Ukraine proves able to strike Russia's oil refining sector again with the same reach and intensity every two to three weeks over several months, this will create a fundamentally new reality in which the Russian economy has to function. 16/16