Between Izium and Orikhiv, the Ukrainian army has developed a massive defensive line spanning 300 km, featuring no…

Between Izium and Orikhiv, the Ukrainian army has developed a massive defensive line spanning 300 km, featuring no fewer than 67 secured checkpoints/passages. For 2 years, Ukraine 🇺🇦 dug thousands of kilometers of ditches to stop Russia 🇷🇺's "infinite" manpower. 🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️

2/ Since December 2024, the Ukrainian military has shifted its defensive strategy. Together with @playfra0, we named these new lines the "New Donbas Line" a term now regularly used by journalists and analysts. Why name these lines this way? Because the two initial lines were dug in a uniform style behind the major Donbas cities of Kramatorsk and Dobropilla. Today, this style of defense can be found across the country: in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, the Donbas, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia.

3/ These lines are different from previous ones. Previously, the Ukrainians prioritized trenches for their own soldiers, with rare anti-tank ditches. But following the debacle at Ocheretyne and then Novohrodivka during the summer of 2024, it became clear that these lines no longer served any purpose, as soldiers were not occupying trenches and bunkers in the middle of open fields.

4/ Consequently, the new strategy relies on obstacles and camouflaged position. The goal of the obstacles is to slow down all assets used by the Russian army to go on the offensive as much as possible: armor, motorized forces, and infantry. To achieve this, the lines are about 100 meters wide and consist of: 🔹1 layer of wire over a 50-meter-wide strip, very discreet, it gets struck in vehicle wheels and is a nightmare for infantry who get caught in it 🔹1 raised row of barbed wire 🔹1 wide and deep anti-tank ditch filled with barbed wire 🔹1 additional row of barbed wire 🔹3 rows of dragon's teeth topped with barbed wire and tied together with heavy-duty wire 🔹2 additional anti-tank ditches filled with barbed wire 🔹1 more row of barbed wire

5/ The list above represents maximum defensive preparation. It should be noted that a number of lines are incomplete; they often lack dragon's teeth or one or two anti-tank ditches. The "light" version of this line consists of just a single anti-tank ditch and 4 rows of barbed wire and loose wire. It should also be noted that additionnal barbed wire is being installed everywhere on the fields to protect positions are extend the "kill zone".

6/ Since construction began, there have been only 3 instances of fighting nearby. At Ivanivka, the (incomplete) line held for 9 months until the current Ukrainian counter-attack. It did not prevent infiltrations, which were numerous, but served as holding points where dozens of bodies have piled up. At Kucheriv Yar, Russian infiltrators managed to cross the lines via roads and gaps in the treelines in August 2025 (which triggered a reform whose details I will explain in the next tweet) but have been since pushed back. Finally, right now, the first Russian infiltrations are taking place in the Shevchenko sector (Dobropilla) where a line is present; despite being incomplete, we will soon see if the Ukrainians make good use of it.

7/ The latest reform of these lines concerns their continuity and depth. In 2025, many lines simply stopped in front of a ravine, a river, a path, a treeline, or a forest. That is no longer the case. Treelines and forests are cleared over at least 500 meters, rivers are covered with barbed wire, and paths/roads are protected by side ditches and barbed wire, channeling movement. Many lines were standalone in 2025; now there are lateral lines, as well as 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and even 6th lines in certain sectors.

8/ Ukrainian positions, trenches, and bunkers haven't vanished, they are now camouflaged. Thousands of positions (often trenches or concrete bunkers) are set inside treelines and forests a few hundred meters behind the main lines, ensuring continuous coverage by Ukrainian drone teams and infantry.

9/ Note also that urban defense has been completely changed. While cities were previously seen as standalone defense lines (with field lines stopping right before them), they are now fully integrated into the overall systems. Most lines near the front line have been fortified on all sides to allow 360° defense. Cities and villages are preferred locations for Ukrainians to conceal equipment and drone operations. It is very clear today that it is easier to detect and strike an enemy infiltration or offensive in the countryside (thanks to these massive lines) than inside urban areas where it is much easier to infiltrate and hide for weeks.

10/ People will inevitably ask me about Ukrainian manpower. I'll answer using the example of the Donbas in 2022–2023. Back then, Ukrainians didn't need to maintain a massive force along the 2014 front line because everything was heavily mined and offensives were easily spotted. A smaller defensive force could hold a larger territory. In the case of these new defense lines, there is roughly 1 road every 5 to 10 km along the line, meaning that over a 100 km stretch, only 10 to 20 points require active monitoring while keeping an eye on the rest. These lines don't solve the manpower shortage, but they fit perfectly into Ukraine's new strategy: fewer men directly on the front line, more men operating drones and robots from the rear while remotely monitoring a vast area.

11/ Let's return to the Orikhiv–Izium line. I chose this example because it is one of the longest continuous lines (there are no gaps wider than 100 meters, including rivers). I chose it because it stretches near the front line at Orikhiv, serves as a 6th line at Petropavlivka, and acts as a 3rd line behind Kramatorsk. In reality, it doesn't exist as a single entity; it is an aggregate of several lines dug at different times in different directions. For this reason, you cannot draw a map with lines 1/2/3 across the whole stretch, as the continuity of these lines evolves.

12/ There is a beginning and an end to this line. The southernmost point is the most vulnerable, located west of Huliaipole; the line in this sector has only a single ditch and hooks onto a 2024 line (obsolete and full of gaps) that served as Southern Ukraine's 2nd defense line at the time. The line currently terminates southeast of Izium on the banks of the Donets River. This section (which forms the 3rd defense line west of Kramatorsk) is nearly completed.

13/ The line passes in front of Novomykolaivka (2nd line in front of the town), Chaplyne, Shaktarske, Petropavlivka, Oleksandrivka, and Barvinkove, with these various small towns acting as rear bases. In total, I counted about 67 prepared roads, including 13 along the most high-risk 61 km stretch currently between the Vovcha River and Orikhiv.

14/ Behind this 300 km long line, I counted at least 500 positions visible on satellite imagery (some are already disappearing under vegetation). Note that 110 km of the line (either located 50 km from the front or very recently dug) only has about 30 currently visible positions. That leaves 470 visible positions along 190 km of the line, which averages 4 positions per kilometer. The actual number is likely 3 to 5 times higher, including deeper positions, invisible ones, and those hidden inside villages.

15/ Many will argue that we aren't seeing the impact of these lines on the front line yet. That is true and completely normal. At present, only 8 km of these lines are located along the active front line (Zaporizhzhia–Kharkiv), which is 650 km long, just 1%! The first real battles around these initial lines of this type are expected toward the end of the year in several sectors.

16/ To sum up, these defense lines form a grid behind the front line (the foremost ones sit 5, 10, or 15 km back). They currently serve no immediate active purpose other than preventing deep breakthroughs. Their actual use will come as Russian infiltrations draw closer. These lines do not replace soldiers, but they require far less manpower to man, allowing firepower to be focused on a few key routes.

17/ Is a breach via heavy firepower possible? Yes, and it's already visible! About 25 airstrikes have hit the line between Huliaipole and Orikhiv, but they are fairly imprecise and the blast radius isn't wide enough to create genuine breaches. A strategy like this will obviously be central to Russian efforts to break through these lines in the long run, which will demand time and massive resources, all while 3, 4, 5, or even 6 additional lines sit right behind the first one.

18/ I believe Putin will not stop his war and that it will drag on for years. Therefore, it's clear that making Russian forces pay a human price isn't enough; every territorial advance must be made so costly that it's no longer worth the expense. Fortifications, drones, artillery, and mid-range strike capabilities are all part of this equation.

19/ That wraps up this long analytical thread based on a defense line to better understand Ukraine's overall strategy. Hundreds of thousands of deep trenches have been dug on both sides. To support my work: buymeacoffee.com/clement.molin Thank you!

I have a question now for soldiers who may have seen the effect of these new lines. I would like you to tell me (you can contact me here or on Telegram) if you are satisfied with these new lines ? Here is my Telegram, make sure to follow me there ! t.me/clement_molin